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Research into Crowdfunding (CF) rarely uses a 
holistic view on the role of relevant actors and their 
activities. We thus demonstrate this gap and need from 
literature and apply an ecosystem perspective to study 
the influence of crowdfunding platforms (CFPs) as 
focal actors on the field from a neo-institutional 
perspective. We look at the structure (focus on 
interaction through activities) and affiliation (focus on 
interconnectedness of actors) of multiple case studies of 
CFPs and ventures to develop five propositions that 
enable us to build early theory on CF as an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem that includes an apt 
conceptualization of the interconnectedness between 
actors and activities, positions and links in order to 
create value - with CFPs as powerful central actors.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Crowdfunding (CF) denominates a set of innovative 
financing options for ventures which opens novel 
investment opportunities for corporate as well as private 
investors. The heterogeneous “crowd” funds either 
projects or whole ventures through the aggregation of 
small individual investments from a large number of 
investors [1-3]. The supplied capital types range from 
donations via a simple pre-financing of products and 
short-term loans to full scale equity investments; all of 
which differ in regimes, rewards and complexity. 
Compared to traditional capital markets, crowdfunding 
is less regulated but therefore bears an inherent risk and 
hence is limited in funding size [4]. Paschen [5] 
provides an overview of crowdfunding-typologies, 
identifies a potential nexus of these with the value-
creation strategies and relevant business models of 
ventures in different stages and, derives 
recommendations for the optimum funding type for 
each stage.  
The crowd itself is still a largely unknown 
phenomenon when it comes to the inner decision-
making processes and motivations [3, 4, 6, 7]. Members 
of the crowd are typically globally dispersed and use 
social media to exchange ideas and inform themselves 
to build collective knowledge  - the so called “wisdom 
of the crowd” [8]. That is enabled by crowdfunding 
platforms (CFPs), which serve as information brokers 
between the capital seeking ventures and the crowd. 
These platforms typically offer a range of services and 
typically generate their revenue streams by taking a 
percentage of the transaction volume [9-11]. 
Belleflamme, et al. [12] explore the economic forces at 
play that influence the design of these platforms from 
an organizational level. Platforms do differentiate in 
their business models per CF typologies, introducing for 
example thresholds and maximum limit concepts to 
address viability concerns from investors. Because of 
this, they attract different investors and ventures.  
Empirical evidence in CF is often either provided 
via reductionist approaches, linking the predicted 
outcome only to a small set of attributes of CF 
campaigns, or via case studies focusing on single actors 
and levels while examining for example the inner 
workings of ventures and the interplay with the crowd 
[13]. Few articles look at CF from a more abstract, 
holistic perspective by including actors and activities, 
positions and links; apart from early works for example 
by Lin and Shih [10] and by Lehner [14] in the realm of 
crowdfunding for social ventures. Yet, such endeavour 
may well provide the necessary transition from a 
phenomenon-driven research that is so far often based 
on individual levels of inquiry, towards a much-needed 
theory building.  
Especially the role of the CFPs as centralized actors 
who potentially influence the whole system via their 
various service offerings and by controlling the 
resource-flows has remained largely unaddressed so far. 
Early insights are provided for example by Maier [15], 
who looks at the necessity for platforms to initiate a 
double switching behaviour in borrowers and investors. 
Other voices such as Haas, et al. [16] provide a typology 
of CFPs, and Lin and Shih [10] look at the role of project 
teams. Both provide valuable insights from their 
specific levels, but the interrelatedness of the various 
actors and their power structures for example remain 
mostly unnoticed.  
Transferring the theoretical concept of an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem from local regions [17] to the 
global socio-technical system of CF, we follow Adner 
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[18] in defining “ecosystem” as “the alignment 
structure of the multilateral set of partners that need to 
interact in order for a focal value proposition to 
materialize.” (p. 40). Adner [18] points out two distinct 
perspectives on ecosystems. The first one, ecosystem-
as-affiliation looks at the interdependence of the actors, 
the potential for synergy or even symbiosis, and focuses 
on questions of the centrality and power of focal actors. 
The second one, ecosystem-as-structure looks 
specifically at the alignment and the interaction through 
activities that is necessary for a certain value 
proposition. In this, he identifies four distinctive 
elements (p. 43): Activities, as discrete actions 
undertaken to achieve the promised value proposition, 
Actors, as entities that undertake these activities and 
exert a power influence, Positions, which localize the 
actors and allow identification of workflows and Links, 
as transfers of various resources, including power, funds 
but also information. 
The objectives of this research endeavour are thus to 
identify the specific activities provided by CFPs [19] 
and to critically assess the role of CFPs as focal actors 
in forming, enabling and restricting crowdfunding from 
an institutionalist standpoint [20].  
Following this we look at the power-structures in the 
relative positioning of the actors and at the links for 
resource transfers. Based on the findings of 23 
exemplary cases of CFPs and ventures we finally build 
early theory on CF as an entrepreneurial ecosystem 
based upon five inductively developed propositions. 
With this we are expanding and following research from 
Haas, et al. [16] and Belleflamme, et al. [12]. 
 
2. State of the Art in CF Research 
 
When looking at the dynamics of success and failure 
of crowdfunding (CF), the role of personal networks 
and the perception of project quality as predictors can 
be seen as focal [2]. Addressing the first, Kuppuswamy 
and Bayus [21] provide longitudinal insights on the 
dynamics of project support over time by examining the 
moderating factors on the effects of goal proximity. 
They find that the predicted positive effect of goal 
proximity in a threshold CF model is accentuated by 
small target goals and limited early support. Such 
findings thus help understand timing effects on the 
crowd motivation.  
Decomposing the somewhat generic, yet 
excessively applied term “crowd”, numerous authors 
look at the role of social capital and community 
processes in CF campaigns. Applying a Bordieuan lens, 
Lehner [8] finds evidence that CF success depends on 
how efficient interaction between different tiers of 
social capital transforms builds a common cultural 
capital that is necessary for the transformation into 
economic capital. In this transformation, he examines 
how these interaction processes are strongly moderated 
by the progressively built cultural and symbolic capital, 
for example through patents [22] of the CF seeking 
venture. 
Colombo, et al. [11] corroborate the above findings 
in a large-scale quantitative setting and ascertains that 
the internal social capital of the whole crowdfunding 
community is indeed affecting its success. As predicted 
in Lehner [8], actions that take place in the early-stages 
such as enlisting a critical number of backers and the 
resulting early capital flow serve as accelerators for the 
previously mentioned transformation process.  
To this, Josefy, et al. [7] outline that addressing a 
community with a strong geographical fit to the 
intended opportunity and the focus on the cultural 
attributes of this community is vital for entrepreneurs 
who are attempting to tap the crowd internationally. 
Distance, as outlined before, can also be overcome by 
emitting signals to various networks via CFPs in order 
to translate the value propositions and activate social 
capital. What is more, Butticè, et al. [24] look at how 
serial crowdfunding acts as a strong signal for social 
capital and ultimately project success. Such signals also 
matter in subsequent stages when it comes to attracting 
venture capital and bank funding for scaling up. 
The interaction between potential funders and the 
crowd generates trust and improves social capital. 
However, little is known how collaboration informs and 
influences opportunity recognition and exploitation and 
thus ultimately innovation and value propositions [25]. 
Valančienė and Jegelevičiūtė [26] specifically look at 
the role of stakeholders and how they influence the 
processes in which value is created. In addition, they see 
the dual identities of customers and suppliers as users 
and backers and discuss the shifting role of financial 
institutions and their influence on value creation. Burns, 
et al. [27] describe this process accordingly as 
stakeholder enrolment and define it as a critical factor 
for forming and exploiting opportunities. 
Venture specific human capital, social capital, 
intellectual capital and the perceived uncertainty [28] 
can be thus be as critical dimensions in order to predict 
CF success. What becomes clear by looking at the 
studies mentioned above is that in all examined 
processes very different actors in very different power 
situations are involved in this network of activities. For 
example, the perceptions and inner workings of 
individual members of the crowd influence the 
organizational outcome of a venture based on the 
presented opportunity at-hand and above all, the 
powerful central node of a CFP provides the links and 
at the same time moderates the resource flow by 
translating cultural capital. This demonstrates the need 
for introducing a systems perspective in form of an 
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ecosystem lens to build theory and transcend the 
perspectives of the individual actors, thus recognizing 
the complex interplay of individuals, organizations and 
the crowd. 
Providing additional evidence of the high 
importance of CFPs as focal actors in such an 
ecosystem, Jääskeläinen and Maula [29] find that 
platforms can address issues of cultural distance and 
potential biases by transforming signals and information 
into a community-relevant cultural context, thus 
creating the impression of a virtual locality. Combining 
this with the above findings, CFPs thus can act as 
boundary spanner not only between the different actors, 
but also between geographical and physical locations of 
the ventures. 
Further demonstrating the powerful central position 
of CFPs, Vismara [30] looks at “information cascades” 
that signify the link of external public profiles of 
investors and investees to the information available at 
the CFP. This fits well with earlier explanations by 
Reuber and Fischer [31], who discuss the importance of 
online technological capabilities and online reputation 
in internet enabled markets and see that platforms work 
as moderators in the pursuit of opportunities.  
Finally, applying a legitimacy lens, Frydrych, et al. 
[32] explore how legitimacy is created by specifically 
targeted constitutional elements of a crowdfunding 
campaign. With respect to the prior mentioned 
perspectives they highlight the role of CFPs as actors 
that bundle not only different interests, but also the 
varying linguistic and constitutional elements of 
campaigns.  
Summing up, two important insights emerge. First, 
the processes that lead to a successful CF campaign use 
signals that need to be built and transferred in a two–
way communication to engage with a culturally adapted 
social capital. Second, these processes bring with a 
complex system of interactions between the actors that 
has the potential to generate value and ultimately drive 
a successful CF campaign. The above reviewed 
literature deals well with many of these facets 
individual, yet CF as an entrepreneurial ecosystem, that 
transcends the levels of intra- and inter-organizational 
research and combines viewpoints on actors and their 
positioning with that of resource links in order to 
generate value through joint activities has not been 
addressed so far and becomes the central objective of 
this article. 
 
3. Ecosystems and CF Platforms 
 
We follow the work of Adner [18], who defines 
ecosystem as: “the alignment structure of the 
multilateral set of partners that need to interact in order 
for a focal value proposition to materialize” (p. 40) 
together with a grammar for the characterization of the 
ecosystem structure by distinguishing between: actors, 
positions, links and activities. Reflecting on the state of 
the art in CF research as outlined in the previous section 
we understand crowdfunding as an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem from a neo-institutional perspective and 
apply Adner’s grammar accordingly in our empirical 
inquires. 
In the literature, networked ecosystems are strongly 
linked to value creation because they help to overcome 
resource-bottlenecks and innovation challenges in firms 
[33]. In what Adner [18] calls an ecosystem-as-
affiliation perspective, the focus of inquiries would be 
on “the breakdown of traditional industry boundaries, 
the rise of interdependence and the potential for 
symbiotic relationships” (p. 41).  
We thus aim to not only look at the role of CFPs as 
single actors or as intermediaries that broker financial 
flows and by that reduce information asymmetries and 
transaction costs; rather we aim to provide insights into 
the transformative character of the crowdfunding 
industry as a whole. Addressing this seems especially 
relevant for phenomena such as crowdfunding that are 
strongly linked to a socio-economic context, because it 
shows the need to include societal perspectives in any 
attempt to build theory.  
Of particular relevance in such an ecosystem are the 
questions of network density and the centrality of some 
focal actors in larger networks. A focal actor seems to 
increase system value through direct and indirect 
network externalities [34]. Platforms in a CF ecosystem 
can thus be seen as such focal actors as they influence 
existing institutions and regimes. Early approaches can 
be found in Wang, et al. [35], who adapt a persuasive 
systems design to come up with a CFP design model.  
Finally, our research also builds on Haas, et al. [16], 
who provide a CFP typology based on Hedonism, 
Altruism and For-Profit, and Belleflamme, et al. [12], 
who explore the economic forces at play that influence 





The objectives of this research endeavour are to 
identify the specific activities provided by CFPs and to 
critically assess the role of CFPs as focal actors in 
forming, enabling and restricting crowdfunding from a 
neo-institutionalist standpoint [20].  
Based on the findings of 23 purposefully sampled 
cases of various types, sizes and industries from eleven 
different CFPs, with a total funded sum of 77,210,781 
USD, a range of: 43,724,820 and average of: 3,356,990, 
we finally build early theory on CF as an entrepreneurial 
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ecosystem based upon five inductively developed 
propositions from a neo-institutional perspective. 
The purposeful selection of the cases was based 
upon the criteria of being either exemplary as identified 
in the literature, or exceptional [36] - with these 
characteristics being identified from a media reception 
analysis in the Forbes magazine over the years 2014-
2017. The cases and platforms were examined in-depth 
through the collection of primary and secondary 
documents, interviews with founders and platform 
managers and ethnographic observations, leading to 
over 300 individual documents. The sampling was 
deemed pseudo-complete after a theoretical saturation 
criterion of “no new codes after 2 additional cases” was 
reached. A full list of the cases and documents can be 
downloaded via the QR code in figure 1, with a 
aggregated sample overview in table 1. 
 































5 propo-   
sitions 
 
Table 1 – Sampling Overview 
 
This inductive approach holds well with Watson 
[37], who demands that entrepreneurship research needs 
to achieve a better balance between studying 
entrepreneurial activities and setting these activities in 
their wider context through ethnographic research with 
concepts from sociology and from pragmatist thinking. 
Watson further argues that field research should be 
innovative in combining in-depth studies of several 
enterprises and their founders with the analysis of 
broader aspects of ‘entrepreneurship in society’, by a 
process of ‘everyday ethnographic’ observation, 
reading, conversation and ongoing analysis.  
Selected excerpts of the data were first transformed 
into standardized meaningful units, discarding 
rhetorical artefacts and then subsequently coded based 
upon the proven techniques as set out by Denzin and 
Lincoln [38]. The transformation into meaningful units 
and the actual coding took place in a multi-coder (3 
persons), recursive and iterative process (all documents 
at least 3 times each with additional codes from others) 
using the software Atlas.TI, with a continuously 
developed coding manual and regular discussions 
between the coders, for example by comparing and 
contrasting differing findings of the same material. All 
disputes (84 out of 1901) were settled using a majority 
system.  
True to the inductive nature of the research no a-
priori codes were applied, yet the previously discussed 
ecosystem framework of actors, activities, positions and 
links was used to give structure to the findings later on, 
following suggestions by Eisenhardt, et al. [39].  
The codes were then summarized into five 
propositions based on the conflux of the findings with 
the existing literature. In this we follow Cornelissen 
[40] suggestions on common styles of theorizing and 
aim to “explain the fuzzy nature of many subjects by 
logically and causally combining different constructs 
into a coherent and explanatory set of types” (p. 3). 
These propositions were then combined to build early 
theory on CF as entrepreneurial ecosystem that we 
further illustrated in a model displaying actors, 
positions, links and activities. 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
 
Using the framework of Adner by distinguishing 
between actors, positions, links and activities, the 
following five propositions were developed. The 7-digit 
numbers in brackets point to the exemplary documents, 
and the full list of cases and documents can be found on 
using the QR link in figure 1. By looking at an example 
document of the case of Pebble on Kickstarter 
[0101019], we explain the numbering in detail: The first 
two digits [01] indicate the platform Kickstarter.com, 
the second pair of digits [..01…] link to the case of the 
Pebble watch itself and the final three digits [.. .. 019] 
refer the document number within that platform and 
case (see link in the QR code in figure 1). 
After the individual discussion of the propositions, a 
summary will be illustrated in figure 2, depicting the CF 
ecosystem with numbers as links to the propositions. 
Proposition 1: CFPs are positioned as trusted 
platforms and centralized catalogues, providing 
signals and localized value-translation in order to 
communicate the legitimacy of the CF-ventures to 
the Crowd. Looking at the cues and signals that are 
created throughout a crowdfunding campaign we find 
that crowdfunding campaigns are used to test market 
acceptance and estimate demand beforehand [0101000, 
0213000, 0221000, 0518000]. The most prominent 
signals we identified were: funding milestones, early 
adoption and pledges, media and news reception, public 
feedback related to both the ideas and the people 
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involved, dedicated investment requests from venture 
capitalists (VCs) inquiring on the progress [0204000], 
and cross venture backing from other campaigns 
[0222303, 0222304]. Besides the signals, we found the 
following cues: the radiance and attire of the 
entrepreneurial team, the innovativeness of the ideas 
and the willingness to respond to questions. 
In some cases, the signal and marketing perspectives 
even dominated the crowdfunding motivation of the 
ventures. As an example, the Nuyu Sleep System 
[022000] uses the platform Indiegogo to gain customer 
feedback from early adopters - individuals highly 
inclined to test new products and services. Because of 
the collaborative spirit of investors in crowdfunding, 
said feedback and the interaction with the crowd may 
well lead to adaptions of the product or business model 
[0101000] and as such may contribute to a successful 
market entry. For example, Pebble adapted their 
watches based on numerous inputs from the crowd and 
was highly successful in three CF campaigns (total 
volume of approximately $44 million [0101241, 
001242, 0101243, 0101247] and ultimately positively 
exited [0101248]. Through signals, including the 
willingness to adapt, trust is created and ultimately the 
legitimacy of the ventures is improved. Another 
example being “MyShowCase” [0310000] who are not 
primarily seeking funds but rather wanting to build a 
solid community of customers and partners for their 
online-run beauty product platform.  
From the perspective of (corporate) venture 
capitalists, CFPs can be seen as a central hub providing 
a catalogue of innovative ideas and a virtual 
marketplace for private and corporate investors 
[0200000] in which the successful funding by the crowd 
would act as a strong signal to institutional investors and 
corporations looking to enhance their real options 
strategies. 
Platforms also need to signal their reputation and 
values to enhance legitimacy. One strategy is to 
embrace ventures with a strong societal relevance and 
high chance of success in their portfolios. Some, such 
as Indiegogo even go so far to create a separate space 
for social causes. One salient example of a donation-
based CF would be the Pencils of Promise [0215000] 
based on Indiegogo’s Generosity. 
Another representative example could be the 
goTenna Mesh project [0107000]. Funded on the 
platform Kickstarter it enables smartphone owners to 
communicate without cell-, Wi-Fi or satellite reception 
in order to assist rescue workers in an emergency 
situation.  
Proposition 2: Strong CPFs as focal actors use 
their power to enable, but also to influence the 
configuration of CF-Ventures in their role as 
gatekeepers. Crowdfunding platforms supply 
brochures and checklists and provide consulting and 
expert services [0100022] to aspiring ventures, for 
example, how to structure their campaigns and create a 
compelling business story [0100023] or how to better 
align their business models [0300188]. In some cases, 
these consulting services also contribute to the income 
of the platforms but more often they are offered for free 
as part of the marketing activities. Comparing guides 
from high profile platforms such as Kickstarter 
[0100000], Indiegogo [0200000] and Crowdcube 
[0300000], they all seem to cover the same topics with 
only nuances of difference. 
The resulting uniformity of the campaigns based on 
the ubiquity of the platforms’ idiosyncratic rules and 
guidelines [0100191, 0200203, 0300190] certainly 
helps investors to better compare CF campaigns and 
thus reduce the transaction costs involved. However, 
besides the obvious beneficial effects of these activities 
there are also unforeseen consequences that may be 
explained through a neo-institutional lens - as the strong 
influence of the platforms and willingness of the 
ventures to adapt may well create an unintentional 
reflexive isomorphic convergence of the ventures, 
which does not lead to a higher legitimacy but only 
results in a lesser variability and unfair discrimination 
of non-conformant campaigns. A reason for this may be 
that ventures see others follow these sets of guidelines 
and rules and blindly pursue the same configuration, not 
because of their success but because of convenience and 
external pressure by the platforms. This again illustrates 
the unequal hierarchical power positions of fund-
seeking ventures and the CFPs as focal actors in the 
crowdfunding ecosystem.  
Besides the role as enabler through the provision of 
advisory services, CFPs also act as gatekeepers in the 
selection of ventures, based on an often-discretionary 
set of rules [0700284, 0700285, 0200206]. In theory, 
this is meant to increase the quality of the visible 
campaigns, but because these rules and the due-
diligence in their execution are often not overly 
transparent and seem to be rather ad-hoc, platforms 
again contribute to an isomorphic system and create 
somewhat unsubstantiated entry-barriers.  
Proposition 3: CFPs as central platforms bring 
together, enable and control the resource-flow 
between ventures and the crowd as actors for Co-
Creation and Open-Innovation processes, by 
making use of rapidly evolving technological 
infrastructure. Platforms provide the technological 
base for a two-way communication infrastructure, 
allowing direct participation of the investors and 
stakeholders. CFPs can be seen to offer a co-creation 
space [0100286, 0214092, 0700284, 0800266, 
0222000] so that investors and stakeholders can actively 
contribute to the dynamic formation of the business 
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model [0100286, 0800253, 0222000] and participate in 
relevant decision-making processes [0101300, 
0101301, 0106297, 0309302]. Taking in the advice 
from the crowd, entrepreneurs can adapt to changes in 
the perceived demand or even follow new opportunities 
[0700284]. For example, Kickstarter provides a 
connection tool to other CF experienced entrepreneurs 
[0100022, 0700307]. Ventures then can directly contact 
established and renowned experts to ask their opinion 
on various potential situations. In addition, direct 
contact to VC and other corporate investors is provided 
via specific tools and platforms [0204000].  
Through the continuous interaction between the 
investors, ventures and the platform co-creation is 
enabled. The question of demands on technological 
savviness of the crowd using tools for co-creation 
however has not been addressed so far and may explain 
the low market share of CF investors from developing 
countries [9900308]. 
Proposition 4a: Ventures reach out to other 
funding sources from actors such as venture 
capitalists, business angels or even other platforms 
via CFPs to initiate so called Cascaded-Funding 
Strategies for scaling. 
Proposition 4b: In these Cascaded-Funding-
Strategies CFPs act as information brokers and 
repositories for the necessary large-scale and 
professional Investor Relations that would otherwise 
overly burden smaller ventures. Ventures not only use 
platforms for their very early-stage funding but also use 
CF more and more to expand their market and scale-up 
their businesses. For this, ventures often seek a mix of 
various funding instruments, including debt, equity and 
reward-based crowdfunding [0517000, 0518148]. In 
this, one especially important perspective seems to be 
the chronology and success of the various options, 
amongst the pitch performance [0116104, 0221218, 
0309051, 0516128] and the funding history [0309054, 
0412086, 0420178, 0420176]. Early ventures typically 
start with some form of reward-based CF [010100, 
0308000, 0411000] and continue later, after the 
successful market entry, to seek additional capital in 
form of debt and equity, either again via a platform or 
from VCs and banks.  
Besides a tailored investment story [0116112, 
0200181, 0200183, 0700283, 0800266], one especially 
relevant strategy for ventures seems to be to create some 
form of intellectual capital, for example patents to be 
used as a collateral in the latter stages of the funding 
process [0102000, 0107000, 0412000, 0619000]. Such 
stepwise developments need very different 
communication strategies for each milestone and can 
thus be seen examined as a “funding cascade”. 
Platforms have to adapt their services in order to attract 
a variety of investor groups and stay relevant for the 
ventures’ additional funding round intentions. One 
problem field that we identified, however, is that the 
presentation of the ventures on dedicated equity CF 
platforms needs to be very different to other forms, as 
cash-flow projections and terminology around profit-
sharing are more predominant. 
An example would be the partnering of the platform 
Indiegogo with Microventures.com, offering access to a 
venture capital network, a business-angel community 
and an equity-crowdfunding platform at the same time. 
A young distillery in the United States named “Republic 
Restoratives” [0204000] makes uses the said 
partnership to further increase their production capacity 
and market share. Via the equity crowdfunding platform 
Crowdcube the “Hop Stuff Brewery” [0308000] runs its 
second campaign to open more bars across the city of 
London and finance their new packaging which fits the 
strategy of large-scale exporting. IntaCept Ltd. 
[0412000] is already running their fourth funding round 
at the Australian equity-based platform ASSOB in order 
to further develop their services and products. 
Concomitantly with the role of a counselling partner 
for funding cascades, CFPs can thus also be understood 
as information brokers between investors of all sorts and 
the ventures with the ultimate goal of reducing 
information asymmetries and leading to a successful 
funding [0100027, 0100028, 0200181, 0200182, 
0221217]. What has been found while analysing the 
provided information is that reporting elements, 
amongst those concerning risk and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) information are often only 
implicitly referred to, compared to the established 
standards in traditionally funded ventures. 
Most pieces of information provided by the 
platforms are aiming to overcome the so-called liability 
of newness of the ventures. The often-short history of 
the fund-seeking ventures poses a substantial risk 
bearing significant transaction costs.  Platforms address 
and mitigate this risk by linking to additional sources of 
information [0204006, 0204007, 0310056]. 
Proposition 5: Public policy and institutionalized 
regimes exert and influence CFPs and are in-term 
influenced by their strong agenda building activities 
and advocacy.  Platforms are not only subjected to 
regulations themselves [0800252, 9900287, 9900288, 
9900291] but also inform and in some cases, influence 
legislation to improve and enhance the current 
regulatory status of crowdfunding [0500220, 9900294, 
9900295]. In many cases, platforms work together on 
this to increase their bargaining power and outreach to 
the relevant authorities. In Europe for example, the 
European Crowdfunding Network (ECN), a network of 
many influential platforms and individuals advocate for 
a common European framework on crowdfunding and 
inform local governments [0500143]. At the same time, 
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it is inherently important for governmental bodies and 
policy makers to be provided with experts from 
different perspectives in the new and often poorly 
understood field of crowdfunding. For example, when 
former US-president Barack Obama signed the JOBS 
Act in 2012, many CFPs were part of the development 
process [9900291] providing their expertise to the 
Senate and Congress. Alongside business angels, VCs 
and other experts, the platforms Indiegogo [0200000], 
Kiva [0700000] and RocketHub [0800000] among 
many others were involved in the development-process 
of the JOBS Act. As European examples, Symbid 
[0600000], a Dutch CFP supports the local legislation 
in coordinating relevant crowdfunding development-
processes and in Austria the platform 1000x1000 
[0500000] has played a crucial role in the new act on 
crowdfunding and crowd investing [0518148]. CFPs 
thus can be seen as catalysts to initiate negotiations and 
policy making concerning societal demands as well as 
the needs of the crowd and the ventures [0500143].  
From a more critical perspective, the previously 
addressed phenomenon of reflexive isomorphism 
makes it easier for CFPs to regulate and tailor the 
market to their own business interests, thus potentially 
overpowering the perspectives of market rivals in the 
field. What is more, some platforms may need to 
compromise their own strategy to comply with demands 
from other powerful players because they rely on 
corporations, institutions and service co-operations in 
their business model, as seen in Kiva [0700274, 
0700275, 0700276] partnering with the HP or 
MasterCard foundations or Ernst&Young as critical 
stakeholders. 
 
6. CF as entrepreneurial ecosystem 
 
Summing up the five propositions and structuring 
the discussed findings within an ecosystem-framework, 
we provide a schema in figure 2 to illustrate the actors, 
positions, links and related activities in a CF enabled 
ecosystem, based on a prior version in Lehner [14]. The 
numbers in this schema correspond to the numbering of 
the propositions as previously outlined.  
 
Figure 2. The CF Ecosystem. The numbers 
indicate propositions 1-5 with bold lines, enhancing 
the figure from Lehner in [14] (dashed lines) 
 
The choice of a venture to seek funding from the 
Crowd thus results in numerous inputs from other actors 
in the system. Platforms function as brokers and in 
many cases as catalysts to induce and align the 
necessary processes in actors and the overall system. 
Discussing and expanding early theory on CFP from 
Haas, et al. [16], who identify three archetypes of CFPs 
based on their aggregated value propositions of 
hedonism (addressing the investors’ sense of interest, 
desire or joy), altruism (attracting investors with an 
interest in the greater good) and for-profit (satisfying 
monetary needs) that purely address the financial role of 
the platforms, we propose additional ones based on the 
above developed propositions 1-5: trusted 
communication partners, gatekeepers, resource 
catalysts, investor relations professionals, and finally 
lobbyists.  
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Such a view on the granular, on the partial value 
propositions, helps to create a link to correlative and 
explanatory research into the business models and the 
competitive positioning of CFPs in the future - as 
Demil, et al. [41] state that a business model can be seen 
as a concept that helps explain various aspects of the 
underlying phenomenon and provides an inherent 
source of value which can be accessed through novelty, 
efficiency, complementarities and lock-ins.  
A big player platform such as Kickstarter or 
Indiegogo will obviously take on many of the above-
mentioned roles with potential attenuating effects 
between, whereas small, niche players may just 
embrace one or two and create a strong profile with the 
help of these. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Seeing CF not as a simple financing process but as 
an ecosystem allows us to understand how value is 
created not only from the individual actors but from 
their systemic interplay [17, 18, 33]. The five major 
propositions from our empirical work point out the 
manifold implications of the activities of CFPs as 
central actors for all other actors in the field. Many 
already individually addressed processes in the 
literature, such as co-creation, can be better understood 
by looking at the configuration of interplay and 
motivation between levels of the individual, 
organizational and societal in an ecosystem. This also 
follows research from Lipusch, et al. [42] who 
conceptualize and examine the concept of co-creation in 
the context of reward-based crowdfunding. With this, 
we touch on and contribute to research from various 
disciplines, amongst them entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurial finance [1, 43], innovation and 
opportunity formation [13, 44, 45], but also from 
sociology and information technology [16, 46].  
To further bring in critical perspectives, borrowing 
from established organizational theories including neo-
institutionalism [32, 47] and configurational theory [48, 
49] we thus suggest approaches such as critical 
discourse analysis [20, 50] and the QCA-method [51] to 
further expand our understanding of CF. Our derived 
fine-grained value propositions provide structure and 
ideas for crowdfunding platforms. As a practical 
implication, this is highly relevant for CFPs, as many 
are still struggling in their competitive positioning and 
many have yet to find a sustainable business model. For 
this, CFPs need additional revenue streams and have to 
create a unique selling proposition from a marketing 
point of view - ideally based on their individually 
selected mix of value propositions. 
Future research will also need to look into how 
specific platform configurations of such value-
propositions may be particularly suitable for certain 
stages of platforms, and how a strategic alignment can 
take place to achieve a pareto-optimum – of course not 
excluding potential equifinalities. 
For ventures seeking funding from the crowd our 
research has made clear that the decision has far-
reaching consequences on their business model and 
governance as they will exchange funding for a strong 
stakeholder influence that is moderated by the chosen 
platform. In order to create a successful campaign, they 
not only need to perfectly align their early business 
model with their choice of platform and type of CF, but 
also need to be aware of signalling effects [52] and 
understand how their investor-relations need to be 
configured to appropriately reach the crowd and entice 
their willingness to co-create.  
What is more, the reputation and technology nexus 
[53] between the ventures and the platform demands a 
careful selection process from both sides, as the 
entrepreneurial opportunity and the individual 
founders’ personalities need to match with the value 
offerings and strategic positioning of the platform.  
Taking on the ecosystem perspective also allows a 
more nuanced understanding of the “whatness” and 
relevance of the “crowd”. Instead of simply tapping the 
crowd, ventures and platforms need to create 
customized communication and activation strategies to 
fully realize the value propositions implied in 
crowdfunding. Besides funding, these would include the 
before mentioned co-creation of opportunities, the 
much needed advocacy in hostile environments [54] and 
decentralized communication channels for public 
relations. What becomes clear is that closer research 
into the crowd needs to be aware of the cultural, 
geographical, demographical and demoscopical value-
specific perspectives, and we thus also propose to stop 
seeing “crowd” as a generic concept for such purposes. 
This reverberates well with McKenny, et al. [55] when 
they suggest topics for future research and ask “How do 
cultural traditions influence perceptions of the 
legitimacy of crowdfunding” (p. 11).  
Finally, Nambisan [56] mentions the intersection of 
digital technologies and entrepreneurship in his work 
and comes up with the definition of digital 
entrepreneurship, which depicts another important 
aspect to consider in CF ventures as more and more 
processes are driven by digitalisation and modern CF 
would not be possible without digital platforms, 
Fintechs and data science driven social media. Research 
on CF as ecosystem may thus also provide additional 
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